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Abstract
The paper contributes to the growing global VAR (GVAR) literature by showing how global
and national shocks can be identied within a GVAR framework. The usefulness of the proposed
approach is illustrated in an application to the analysis of the interactions between public debt and
real output growth in a multicountry setting, and the results are compared to those obtained from
standard single country VAR analysis. We nd that on average (across countries) global shocks
explain about one third of the long-horizon forecast error variance of output growth, and about
one fth of the long run variance of the rate of change of debt-to-GDP. Evidence on the degree
of cross-sectional dependence in these variables and their innovations are exploited to identify the
global shocks, and priors are used to identify the national shocks within a Bayesian framework. It
is found that posterior median debt elasticity with respect to output is much larger when the rise
in output is due to a scal policy shock, as compared to when the rise in output is due to a positive
technology shock. The cross country average of the median debt elasticity is 1.58 when the rise
in output is due to a scal expansion as compared to 0.75 when the rise in output follows from a
favorable output shock.
Keywords: Factor-augmented VARs, Global VARs, identication of global and country-specic
shocks, Bayesian analysis, public debt and output growth, debt elasticity.
JEL Classication: C30, E62, H6.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between public debt expansion and economic growth became a widely discussed
topic of policy importance in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 nancial crisis, and the ensuing euro area
sovereign debt crisis. Some of the debate and the related literature on the causes and consequences
of rising public debt relative to GDP is reviewed below in Section 2. This paper contributes to this
literature by developing an empirical model of the inter-connections between output growth and public
debt in a multi-country setting where global and national e¤ects are separately identied.
This paper also contributes to the growing Global VAR (GVAR) literature, originally introduced by
Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004).1 Our starting point for modelling a large (multi-country) set
of interconnected macroeconomic variables is a factor-augmented panel vector error correcting model,
where strong cross-country linkages are modelled using unobserved common factors. We assume that
the number of countries (N) and the number of available time periods (T ) are both large. Using our
setup, we derive a GVAR representation that features a global (common) and national (country-specic
or idiosyncratic) error structure.2 These derivations build on the previous contributions by Dées, di
Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007), Chudik and Pesaran (2011), Chudik, Grossman, and Pesaran
(2016), and recently Cesa-Bianchi, Pesaran, and Rebucci (2018). GVAR models in the literature
typically do not distinguish between global and national shocks. We argue in favor of the representation
derived in this paper, which explicitly takes the two types of shocks into account. In addition, we
discuss the problem of identication of global and national shocks, within the context of the empirical
application.
Country-specic models estimated in our framework feature (lagged) domestic variables, (lagged)
cross section averages, and (contemporaneous) global shocks estimated using a VAR model in cross
section averages. The individual country models in this paper thus di¤er from the traditional VAR
models in the literature, which contain domestic variables only. The omission of global shocks and
lagged cross section averages can result in miss-specied country-specic models. Cross section aver-
ages could be replaced by principal component (PCs).3 But, if PCs are employed, we suggest that the
rst principal component of each variable type is used in place of cross section averages, as opposed to
the standard practice where a pre-selected number of PCs are estimated from all the variables under
1A survey of GVARs is provided in Chapter 33 of Pesaran (2015b).
2This is in contrast to the traditional factor-augmented VAR models in the literature (Bernanke, Bovian, and Eliasz,
2005, Stock and Watson, 2005, and Bai, Li, and Lu, 2016, among others), which typically assume a single cross-section
unit (N = 1), and treat the factors as given or estimated from a large set of additional variables.
3Note that large N is su¢ cient for the convergence of cross section averages, whereas PCs rely on both N and T
large.
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consideration together.
We apply the proposed modelling approach to annual data on debt and output growth covering
a diverse set of advanced and emerging economies, over the period 1965-2015. We rst investigate
the evidence on the long-run relationship between public debt and real output, and consider the main
theoretical result from balanced growth models in the literature (Diamond (1965), Blanchard (1985),
or Saint-Paul (1992)) that predict log output and log public debt must cointegrate with coe¢ cients
(1; 1). We nd the evidence to be mixed, with cointegration supported for only half of the countries in
our sample; and even in such cases we still nd statistically signicant departures from the cointegrating
vector of (1; 1). Therefore, in the empirical analysis we focus on business cycle e¤ects, and abstract
from the long run inuences. Much longer time series seem to be required if we are to allow for long
run e¤ects in our analysis, as well.
We nd that global shocks are statistically signicant and economically important, and argue that
they should be included in individual country models to avoid biased estimates. Our ndings suggest
that two global shocks are su¢ cient for modelling of output and public debt in a multicountry setting.
Motivated by evidence on the cross-sectional dependence of debt and output variables, and following
Cesa-Bianchi, Pesaran, and Rebucci (2018), we impose a triangular ordering to identify a global growth
shock, which alone explains the strong pattern of cross-sectional dependence of output growth well, and
a residual global debt shock, which, together with the global growth shocks, is necessary to explain the
strong pattern of cross-sectional dependence for the debt-to-GDP variable. Global shocks are found to
be responsible for 31 percent of variance (at long horizons) for the output growth, and 21 percent of the
variance of the debt-to-GDP variable. In addition to the identication of global shocks, we also consider
the problem of identication of national shocks, where following Baumeister and Hamilton (2015), we
employ priors in a Bayesian framework to point identify and estimate country-specic elasticity of
debt with respect to output when output expands due to technology and scal policy shocks. We nd
considerable heterogeneity in mean and median debt elasticities across countries with large posterior
interquartile ranges, which could be due to estimation uncertainty as well as weak prior identication.
On average the median elasticity of debt to GDP is 0.75 following a positive technology shock, and
much higher at 1.4 following a scal expansionary shock. Thus debt accumulation is likely to be much
more serious when output growth is driven by scal expansion as compared to technologically driven
growth. Finally, the results from our multicountry models are compared to standard single country
VAR analyses and their di¤erences highlighted.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the literature on debt
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and growth. Section 3 derives GVAR representation featuring global and national shocks. Section 4
provides a long-run perspective on public debt and output. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the problem of
identication, and present the empirical results on the e¤ects of global and national shocks. Some
concluding remarks are provided in Section 7. The paper is accompanied by an appendix and an
online supplement that give the mathematical derivations, data sources, and additional results.
2 Literature on debt and growth
The relationship between public debt expansion and economic growth has attracted interest in recent
years, spurred by the sharp increase in government indebtedness in some advanced economies following
the 2007-2008 global nancial crisis. However, this relationship is a complex one, and economic theory
alone does not provide a clear guidance as the quantitative importance or the causal nature of the
relationship between debt and growth. Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) argue that proigate debt-
generating scal policy (and high public debt) can have a negative impact on long-term growth by
crowding out private investment, although it is acknowledged that this e¤ect could be quantitatively
small. There are several other channels through which sustained debt accumulation can harm economic
growth. For example, an upward sloping debt trajectory beyond certain levels could lead investors to
worry about the countrys debt sustainability. Reecting this risk, economic agents would be willing
to hold government securities only at higher borrowing costs. The lower demand and investment due
to higher interest rates in turn can have negative consequences for economic growth in the long run.
Since the higher cost of government borrowing poses an additional strain on scal balances, an increase
in government bond yields could lead to further loss of condence and become self-fullling. In an
extreme case, a crisis could occur. The negative growth e¤ect of public debt could also be larger in
the presence of policy uncertainty or expectations of future conscation (possibly through ination
and nancial repression). See, for example, Cochrane (2011b) and Cochrane (2011a).
Contrary to this view, DeLong and Summers (2012) argue that hysteresis arising from recessions
can lead to a situation in which expansionary scal policies may have positive e¤ect on long-run
growth. Krugman (1988) argues that nonlinearities and threshold e¤ects can arise from the presence
of external debt overhang, but it is not clear whether such an argument is applicable to advanced
economies where the majority of debt-holders are residents. Nonlinearities may also arise if there is a
turning point above which public debt suddenly becomes unsustainable; see, for instance, Ghosh et al.
(2013).
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Although economic theory provides mixed results on the relationship between public debt and
growth, the arguments so far abstract from the composition of additional government spending that
gives rise to higher public debt. Such additional government expenditure could be invested in pro-
ductive public capital (such as infrastructure, education or health) and could be growth enhancing.
Consequently, the net e¤ect of debt accumulation on economic growth cannot be established theoret-
ically and requires a careful empirical analysis.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between debt and growth until recently focussed on the
role of external debt in developing countries, and so far there has been only a few studies that include
evidence on the advanced economies. Moreover, while the focus of the earlier literature was on the
long-run e¤ects of public debt, the possibility of a threshold e¤ect between public debt and output
growth became a heated debate in the literature and among policy-makers in advanced economies in
particular. A well-known inuential study is Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010), who argue for a non-linear
relationship, characterized by a threshold e¤ect, between public debt and growth in a cross-country
panel. Their main result is that the median growth rate for countries with public debt over 90 percent
of GDP is around one percentage point per annum lower than median growth of countries with debt-
to-GDP ratio below 90 percent. In terms of mean growth rates, this di¤erence turns out to be much
higher and amounts to around 4 percentage points per annum.
The analysis of Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) has generated a considerable degree of debate in the
literature, not to mention among policy-makers, some of whom have used the 90 percent threshold to
justify austerity programs, while others have questioned whether such a threshold is relevant across
all countries. See, for example, Woo and Kumar (2015), Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012),
Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), and Reinhart et al. (2012); who discuss the choice of debt brackets
used, changes in country coverage, data frequency; econometric specication, and reverse causality
going from output to debt.4 These studies address a number of important modelling issues not
considered by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010), but they nevertheless employ panel data models that
impose slope homogeneity and do not adequately allow for cross-sectional dependence across individual
country errors. It is implicitly assumed that di¤erent countries converge to their equilibrium at the
same rate, and there are no spillover e¤ects of debt overhang from one country to another. These
assumptions do not seem plausible given the diverse historical and institutional di¤erences that exist
across countries, and the increasing degree of interdependence of the economies in the global economy.
More specically, neglecting error cross-sectional dependencies can lead to spurious inference and
4See also Panizza and Presbitero (2013) for a survey and additional references to the literature.
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false detection of threshold e¤ects, since global factors (including interest rates in the U.S., cross-
country capital ows, global business cycles, and world commodity prices) play an important role in
precipitating sovereign debt crises with long-lasting adverse e¤ects on economic growth. For example,
favorable terms of trade trends and benign external conditions typically lead to a borrowing ramp-
up and pro-cyclical scal policy. When commodity prices drop or capital ows reverse, borrowing
collapses and defaults occur followed by large negative growth e¤ects.
To address these shortcomings Chudik et al. (2017) use a cross-country dynamic panel data model
that allows for endogeneity of debt and growth, xed e¤ects, slope heterogeneity, and cross-sectional
error dependence. They conduct a formal statistical analysis of debt threshold e¤ects using data
on a sample of 40 countries (as well as to two sub-groups of advanced and developing economies)
over the 1965-2010 period, but do not nd a universally applicable simple threshold e¤ect in the
relationship between public debt and growth. However, they nd statistically signicant evidence
when the threshold e¤ects are interacted with the growth of debt-to-GDP, thus concluding that the
trajectory of debt-to-GDP is more important for economic growth than the level of debt-to-GDP
itself.5
Although the long-term economic impact of public debt accumulation is subject to a heated debate,
economists tend to agree that in the short run an increase in public debt, following an expansionary
scal policy shock, such as a lowering of the income tax rate, can improve domestic demand and
raise output. However, both negative and positive relationships between output and deb-to-GDP are
possible over the course of the business cycle. More specically, an unexpected increase in output,
following a positive technology shock, for example, can result in larger scal revenue, and an improved
debt-to-GDP ratio, whilst the output rise primarily initiated through increased government expendi-
ture or lower tax rates can result in higher debt-to-GDP ratio. In this paper we focus on the business
cycle e¤ects of scal and technology shocks and identify such shocks at both global and national levels,
and provide empirical evidence on conditions under which increases in debt-to-GDP has or does not
have a dampening e¤ect on economic growth. Our empirical analysis is thus complementary to the
recent empirical literature on the long-run e¤ects of rising debt on output growth.
5Note that while it is theoretically possible for governments to inate the local-currency-denominated debt away
by monetizing (printing money), this is impossible for foreign-currency-denominated debt. In the latter case, a public
debt crisis could also trigger currency and/or banking crises with more profound consequences for economic growth.
High and increasing public debt might also constrain the ability of scal authorities to smooth economic cycles. These
considerations provide some support for the negative association between growth and debt trajectory in conjunction with
a su¢ ciently high level of debt.
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3 GVAR representation of factor-augmented panel VAR models
Suppose there are N countries, and let xit be a k  1 vector of domestic variables in country i =
1; 2; :::; N , that are also subject to an m 1 vector of unobserved common factors denoted by gt. We
consider the following factor-augmented VAR specication for xit
xit = ai  izi;t 1 +
p 1X
`=1
 i`zi;t ` + eit, for i = 1; 2; :::; N , (1)
where zit = (x0it;g
0
t)
0, and suppose that gt follows the VAR(p) model6
gt = ag +
p 1X
`=1
 g`gt ` + vgt. (2)
The innovations of the country-specic models, eit, are allowed to be cross-sectionally correlated, as
well as being correlated with vgt. Let E (eitjvgt) =  vivgt, in which  vi is a k m loading matrix,
and let "it = eit   E (eitjvgt). Then, without loss of generality, eit can be decomposed as
eit =  vivgt + "it, for i = 1; 2; ; :::; N , (3)
where vgt and "it are serially uncorrelated with zero means, and by construction, "it and vgt, are
uncorrelated. This represents a decomposition of the reduced-form errors, eit, into the m  1 vector
of reduced-form global shocks, vgt, and the k  1 vector of reduced-form national shocks, "it. Also to
identify the national shocks we shall assume that "it are cross-sectionally weakly correlated.
Following Pesaran (2006), we use cross section averages
xt = W
0xt =
NX
i=1
Wixit, (4)
and their lags to estimate the global shocks vgt (up to a non-singular mm transformation matrix),
where W = (Wi;W2; :::;WN )
0 is the nk weight matrix, satisfying the usual granularity conditions:
kWk = O

N 1=2

, and
kWik
kWk = O

N 1=2

, for any i. (5)
In order to derive large-N representation of cross section averages in model (1)-(2), we require a number
6A more general global factor-augmented error-correcting model with detailed derivations is presented in Section A.1
of the Appendix.
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of regularity assumptions. Under: (i) the standard assumptions on VECM models in the literature
(see Assumption 1 in the Appendix), (ii) weak cross-sectional dependence of "it (see Assumption 2
in the Appendix), and (iii) full rank of  wv =
PN
i=1 Wi  and invertibility requirements that rule out
long memory features in xt (see Assumption 3 in the Appendix), we obtain
xt = ax +
pTX
`=1
	w`xt ` + vt +Op

N 1=2

+Op (
pT ) , (6)
for some 0 <  < 1, where 	w` are exponentially decaying coe¢ cient matrices in `, and
vt =  wvvgt, (7)
are the reduced-form global shocks. vt is identied from (6) as N ! 1. Following the arguments in
Chudik and Pesaran (2011, 2013), VAR representation for cross section averages (6) can be estimated
by least squares.7 We denote orthogonalized LS residuals from the regressions of xt on the constant
and its lagged values by bvt.
Using this approximation of common shocks, we obtain the following large-N country-specic
representations. When i = 0 (as in our application below), and omitting the large-N approximation
and the truncation lag error terms for ease of exposition, we obtain
xit = axi +
pTX
`=1
i`zi;t ` + Biv^t + "it, (8)
where zit = (x0it;x
0
t)
0 and Bi =  vi

 
0
wv wv
 1
 
0
wv. Augmented country-specic VAR representa-
tions (8) can be estimated separately and then stacked and solved in a global VAR representation for
xt = (x
0
1t;x
0
2t; :::;x
0
Nt)
0.
Augmented country VARs in (8) explicitly account for a global and national error structure, and
di¤er from the conventional GVAR specications, namely8
xit = axi +
pTX
`=1
xi`xi;t ` +
pTX
`=0
xi`xt ` + "it. (9)
GVAR literature stacks the estimates of (9) in one large system and solves for the VAR representation
of xt. It is easily seen the two representations, (9) and (8) are equivalent and yield the same estimates
7As N;T !1 jointly such that N=T !  > 0 and pT = 

T 1=3

, where  (:) denotes the exact order of magnitude.
8See, for example, Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004), Dées, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007), or the
references provided in Chapter 33 of Pesaran (2015b).
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of the reduced-form national shocks, "it.9 However, (8) allows the identication of the global shocks
whereas (9) does not.10
Stacking the country-specic equations in (8), we obtain:
xt = ax+
pTX
`=1
G`xt ` + Bv^t + "t, (10)
where xt = (x01t;x02t; :::;x0Nt)
0, "t = ("01t; "02t; :::; "0Nt)
0, B = (B01;B01; :::;B0N )
0, G` = `fW, for
` = 1; 2; :::; p, ` is block-diagonal with diagonal blocks given by i`, and fW is dened by the identity:
zt = fWxt, z = (z01t; z02t; :::; z0Nt)0. The GVAR representation (10) features reduced-form global and
national shocks, and can be used for a structural analysis where both types of shocks can be identied.
We summarize the practical steps involved in obtaining the GVAR representation in (10), with the
errors decomposed into reduced-form global and national shocks:
Step 1: Compute the orthogonalized residuals v^t, by estimating a VAR(pT ) model in cross section aver-
ages xt. The ordering of the variables in xt will be discussed below. Principal Components
(PCs) can also be used instead of cross section averages if the method of PCs is applied to
individual variables xijt, over i. The lag order, pT ; can be estimated using Akaike or Bayesian
Information Criteria, or set to pT = T 1=3 as argued in Chudik and Pesaran (2011, 2013).
Step 2: Estimate the country-specic VARmodels augmented with v^t, plus the lagged valuesxt 1; :::;xt pT .
Step 3: Stack country-specic models from Step 2 in the full GVAR representation, (10), to be used for
impulse response analyses and error variance decomposition.
The estimated reduced-form global shocks (v^t) are by construction orthogonal to the country-
specic residuals ("^it). The strong cross section dependence of global shocks, and the weak cross
section dependence of national shocks help to identify (as N ! 1) the common shocks from the
national shocks. Individual common shocks themselves are identied only up to a rotation matrix,
and so are the individual national shocks. Identication of the two types of shocks need to be treated
separately and will be discussed in the context of our application below.
9This follows because v^t are computed as residuals from regressions of xt on its lagged values.
10 In addition, Chudik, Grossman, and Pesaran (2016, Section 4.1) show that stacking (9) could result, under certain
conditions, in an undetermined system when the unobserved common factor is strong, and N ! 1. This problem is
avoided by using (8).
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4 Long-run perspective on public debt and output
Balanced growth models with government debt nancing predict that in the long run steady state
the debt-to-GDP must be stationary. Let it = (yit; dit)
0, where yit is the log of real output and dit
is the log of public debt, broadly dened. Then the long run theory predicts that yit   dit must be
stationary, regardless of the global factors gt. See, for example, Diamond (1965), Blanchard (1985),
and Saint-Paul (1992). Suppose further that yit are integrated of order one, or I (1) for short. Then
two important conclusions follow. First, dit must also be I(1). Second, yit and dit must be cointegrated
such that 0iit  I (0), where i = (1; 1)0 is the cointegrating vector. It is also worth noting that such
cointegrating relationship holds regardless of country interlinkages, captured above by gt. However,
error-correcting terms as well as country-specic innovations could still be a¤ected by global shocks,
but gt cannot enter the country-specic cointegrating relationships between debt and output.
Table 1: Country coverage
Europe MENA Countries Asia Pacic Latin America
Austria Egypt Australia Argentina
Belgium Iran China Brazil
Finland Morocco India Chile
France Tunisia Indonesia Ecuador
Germany Turkey Japan Peru
Italy Korea Venezuela
Netherlands Malaysia
Norway North America New Zealand Rest of Africa
Spain Canada Philippines Nigeria
Sweden Mexico Singapore South Africa
Switzerland United States Thailand
United Kingdom
Notes: See Section A.5 in the Appendix for the description of data.
The long-run relationship between yit and dit, although theoretically compelling, there are many
reasons that it might not hold in practice, due to measurement problems, bond market imperfections
and the ability of the governments to shift the burden of debt from one generation to the next through
debt monetization.11 As a result there could be prolonged periods over which yit and dit deviate from
11Debt monetization involves the government issuing new government bonds which are then purchased by the central
bank thereby increasing the money supply.
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one another with only a very slow rate of adjustment towards equilibrium. To shed light on the long
run relationship between yit and dit, we constructed an annual database featuring the real GDP and
the gross government debt time series for a panel of 39 countries covering the sample period 1965-
2016. This panel features a diverse set of advanced and emerging economies. The panel is slightly
unbalanced at the beginning of the sample due to unavailability of data in the case of some of the
emerging economies. The list of the countries in our sample is provided in Table 1, while details on
data sources are given in the Appendix A.5.
Figure 1 provides the time series plots of yit and dit. These charts show a mixed picture. There
appears to be a close relationship between output and debt in Austria, China, India, and perhaps
Egypt. In contrast, the long-run relationship does not appear to hold for Australia and Chile over
the particular sample period we consider. For the remaining countries the gures alone do not help
and a more formal statistical investigation is required. To this end we rst carried out unit root tests
to conrm that both yit and dit are I (1) as opposed to being I (0). The results are in line with
our expectations and other similar studies in the literature, in particular for yit. Next we carried out
maximum eigenvalue and trace cointegration tests of Johansen (1991) using a VAR(4) with unrestricted
intercepts. The test results for all the 39 countries are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. As
can be seen the test outcomes give a mixed picture. With data spanning a few decades, the null of
no cointegration between yit and dit cannot be rejected for about half of the countries in our sample.
In addition, even when the cointegrating relationship between yit and dit is statistically conrmed, it
does not necessarily follow that the cointegrating vector is (1; 1)0. See Table A2 in the Appendix for
estimates of the long run relationships. In the steady state we must have dit  yit  I (0), otherwise a
balanced growth path cannot exist. But in the medium-to-long run we could have i 6= (1; 1)0 (or no
cointegration), as we nd in our sample which might not be su¢ ciently long for the purpose of long
run analysis.
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Figure 1: Plots of real GDP and public debt (right scale), in logs
United States Japan Germany
United Kingdom France Italy
Spain Canada Australia
Finland Norway New Zealand
Netherlands Belgium Austria
Switzerland Sweden Korea
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Figure 1 (Ctd.) Plots of real GDP and public debt (right scale), in logs
China India Brazil
Mexico Argentina Venezuela
Chile Ecuador Peru
South Africa Iran Turkey
Egypt Morocco Tunisia
Malaysia Indonesia Philippines
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5 Global output and scal policy shocks and their e¤ects
Given the mixed long-run evidence, in this paper we abstract from the error-correcting terms in (1)
and focus on the relationship of output growth and the rate of change of debt-to-GDP over the
business cycle. Accordingly, we dene xit = (bit;yit)
0 to aid the subsequent discussion of shock
identication, where bit = dit   yit is the rate of change of debt-to-GDP, and yit is the real
output growth. Empirically, country-specic VAR models in terms of (bit;yit) and (yit,dit) are
equivalent, but identication of the shocks is simpler to motivate under the former formulation.
The reduced-form global shocks vt are identied from (6) when N is large, but the common factors,
gt, and a rotated global shocks that have an economic interpretation are not identied. For identica-
tion of the global shocks, a suitable linear combination of the reduced-form global shocks, dened by
Avvt, could be considered. The choice of Av can be based on economic theory considerations. This
could be done in the context of a VAR in cross section averages (4), by considering the impact of
global structural shocks on the global aggregates alone. Alternatively, the choice of Av can be based
on a characterization of the impacts of structural common shocks on individual cross-section units,
using the GVAR representation (10).
The choice of Av could also be guided by the pattern of cross section dependence observed in data
with or without conditioning on a suitably dened set of cross section averages, as in Cesa-Bianchi,
Pesaran, and Rebucci (2018, hereafter CPR). CPR consider a quarterly multicountry model of real
output growth and equity market volatility, and propose a novel identication scheme whereby the
di¤erential pattern of cross-sectional correlation of the innovations to output growth and volatility are
used to identify the global shocks as a global growth shock from a global nancial shock. Specically,
they nd that output growth and volatility are both cross-sectionally strongly dependent (CSD), but
conditional on world output growth, the resultant country-specic output growth innovations are no
longer strongly cross-correlated, but in contrast residuals of the regressions of volatility series on world
output growth continue to be CSD, thus suggesting a recursive scheme for identication of the global
shocks. We follow the same approach below, and use evidence on cross section dependence of yit
and bit and their innovations conditional on their global counterparts, namely yt = N 1
PN
i=1 yit
and bt = N 1
PN
i=1 bit, to motivate identication of global shocks.
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5.1 Evidence on cross section (CS) dependence
We use the exponent of CS dependence, average pair-wise correlations and Pesarans CD test to
measure the signicance and degree of CS dependence inyit andbit and their innovations computed
as residuals from the regressions of yit and bit on yt and/or bt and their lagged values, namely
regressions that are augmented with cross section averages, yt and bt. Bailey et al. (2016, hereafter
BKP) dene the parameter  as the exponent of CS dependence of xit if Std (xt) = 	
 
N 1

, where
xt = N
 1PN
i=1 xit. Consequently,  = 1 corresponds to the standard factor model, whereas the
typical spatial models imply much weaker CS dependence with   1=2. BKP show that it is possible
to identify and consistently estimate  for values of  > 0:5. Pesaran (2004)s CD test is based on the
average of pair-wise correlations,
CD =
r
TN (N   1)
2
b, where b = 2
N (N   1)
N 1X
i=1
NX
j=i+1
^ij ; (11)
and ^ij is the sample correlation of xit and xjt. Pesaran (2015a) show that the null of CD test depends
on relative expansion rates of N and T . When T = O (N ) for some 0 <   1, the implicit null is
given by  = O
 
N2 2

, for 0   < (2  ) =4, which gives 0   < 0:25 when  = 1. Under the
null, CD is asymptotically distributed as N (0; 1).
Findings for these three measures of CS dependence, applied to yit and bit as well as residuals
obtained from country-specic VAR models with or without CS augmentation are reported in Table
2. These results suggest that: (1) yit and bit are quite strongly cross-sectionally dependent, since the
estimates of ^ fall in the range of 0.92-0.94 with an upper 95 percent condence bound 0.99, and
the reported values of CD test statistics are very high, in the range of 27-37, (2) yit is weakly CS
dependent conditional on the world growth factor, since ^ falls to 0.63, and CD test statistics falls to
-2.4, and (3) bit conditional on the world growth factor continue to be strongly CS correlated with
the CD test statistics falling to 8.8 which is still statistically highly signicant, and the estimates of
the exponent of CS dependence falling only to 0.78, which is still sizable. Hence, there is evidence
for a single world growth factor in yit. But an additional factor is required for modelling of bit.
These conclusions match the ones obtained by CPR in their analysis of growth and volatility. We use
these di¤erences in the patterns of cross country correlations to motivate our proposed identication
of innovations to world growth factor, as in CPR.
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Table 2: Average pair-wise correlations (), Pesarans CD test statistics, and estimates
of the exponent of CS dependence (^).
Estimates of b CD Lower 5% ^ Upper 95%
Data in rates of change (de-meaned)
bit 0.15 27.5 0.88 0.94 0.99
yit 0.19 37.0 0.85 0.92 0.99
VAR in xit without augmentation with CS avg.
bit residuals 0.11 20.9 0.86 0.92 0.97
yit residuals 0.17 31.5 0.86 0.94 1.01
VAR in xit augmented with lags of xt
bit residuals 0.12 21.4 0.87 0.93 0.98
yit residuals 0.16 29.9 0.87 0.94 1.01
VAR in xit augmented with v^y;t and lags of xt
bit residuals 0.05 8.8 0.75 0.78 0.81
yit residuals -0.01 -2.4 0.57 0.63 0.69
VAR in xit augmented with v^y;t; v^b;t, and lags of xt
bit residuals 0.00 0.9 0.64 0.68 0.72
yit residuals -0.01 -2.3 0.58 0.64 0.70
Notes: The top part of this table presents the average pair-wise cross-sectional correlations (b) and the CD test dened
in (11), and the estimates of the exponent of CS dependence by Bailey et al. (2016), all applied to the data bit and
yit (de-meaned). CD test is proposed and discussed by Pesaran (2004) and Pesaran (2015a). The remaining parts of
this table report these statistics for the residuals of country-specic VARs with or without augmentations.
5.2 Estimated global shocks
In line with the evidence above, we follow CPR and identify the innovations to world growth factor
(vy;t), and the innovations to world debt factor (vb;t) as:
vy;t = yt   E (ytj It 1) , and (12)
vb;t = bt   E
 
bt
yt; It 1 , (13)
where It 1 is the information set consisting of all information available up to period t   1. This
ensures that vy;t and vb;t are mutually and serially uncorrelated. We use the VAR representation in
cross-section averages (6), estimated by LS, and the ordering scheme (12)-(13) to obtain estimates
of the global shocks, denoted by v^t = (v^y;t; v^b;t)
0. In what follows, we refer to vy;t and vb;t as global
output and global scal policy shocks, respectively.
5.3 Country-specic e¤ects of the global shocks
To corroborate the evidence on the pattern of CS dependence, we present additional tests summarizing
the signicance of the global shocks in country-specic regressions. Table 3 reports the coe¢ cients of
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the global shocks and their t-ratios for all the 39 countries in our sample. As can be seen the global
growth shock is statistically signicant in output equation in the majority of countries (28 out of 39),
and to a lesser degree in the debt-to-GDP regressions (6 out of 39). In contrast, the global debt shock
is (with the exception of Nigeria, Singapore and Switzerland) statistically signicant only in the debt
equation (15 out of 39).12
Regarding the magnitude of coe¢ cients of the output shock in the output equation, it is interesting
to observe that the largest coe¢ cients belong to emerging economies (Peru 2.6, Malaysia 2.06, Brazil
1.83, and Argentina 1.36 among others), whereas advanced economies tend to have smaller coe¢ cients,
albeit highly signicant in most cases, and generally close to one (for example USA 0.87, France 0.82,
Germany 1.08, and Japan 1.02). The size of the economy and industry mix are both likely to be
important determinants of the size of these coe¢ cients, in addition to their degree of integrations to
the global economy. The countries with statistically insignicant loadings on the global growth factor
(at the 10 percent level) includes Australia, New Zealand, India, Iran, Nigeria, and Chile. From this set
only three of these countries had a negative loadings, namely India, Iran, and Nigeria. These outcomes
could be the result of many factors, such as inward-looking economic policies, wars, revolutions, and
economic sanctions. For example, Indian economy started to become liberalized and integrated to
the rest of the world economy only from late 1990s, whilst both Iran and Nigeria have experienced
prolonged periods of wars and economic instability. The low estimates of the coe¢ cients on the global
growth factor for Australia and New Zealand could be due to the remoteness of these economies from
Europe and the US.
Signicant loadings on the global shocks relate to the contributions of the global shocks to the
overall t of country-specic models. Standard errors of the reduced-form errors in the models with
and without CS augmentations are provided in Table A3 in the Appendix. Standard errors of reduced-
form errors are larger by about 23 percent in the case of output equation and by about 15 percent
in the case of debt equations, with somewhat larger di¤erences observed for advanced economies in
the case of output equations. Low ratios are observed in countries where CS augmentation did not
contribute to a meaningful increase in the t (e.g. Iran), and the reported di¤erences are well in line
with the reported ndings in Table 3.
12These tests are carried out at the 5 percent signicance level.
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Table 3: Evidence on statistical signicance of global shocks in country-specic VARs
output eq. (yit) debt eq. (bit)
v^y;t v^b;t v^y;t v^b;t
coef. t-stat coef. t-stat coef. t-stat coef. t-stat
Argentina 1.36y 2.03 -0.04 -0.25 -1.24 -0.27 3.04y 2.77
Australia 0.32 1.51 -0.03 -0.49 -2.69? -1.74 1.31y 3.47
Austria 0.73y 3.18 -0.10? -1.75 0.40 0.51 0.66y 3.56
Belgium 0.96? 1.69 -0.03 -0.26 -0.12 -0.19 0.06 0.47
Brazil 1.83y 4.49 0.13 1.31 -0.16 -0.04 1.74y 2.06
Canada 0.82y 3.99 0.01 0.25 -1.52? -1.75 0.21 0.98
Chile 0.44 0.62 -0.25 -1.42 -8.50y -2.87 1.03 1.41
China 0.90y 2.52 0.15? 1.70 2.14 0.73 0.39 0.53
Ecuador 0.71 1.32 -0.13 -1.00 3.41 1.53 1.74y 3.21
Egypt 0.68 1.29 0.14 1.18 -1.99 -0.62 0.55 0.78
Finland 1.05y 3.10 -0.08 -0.92 -2.95? -1.86 1.07y 2.77
France 0.82y 5.94 0.01 0.26 -0.68 -0.48 0.08 0.22
Germany 1.08y 3.67 -0.05 -0.68 -1.03 -1.30 0.36? 1.94
India -0.42 -1.10 -0.04 -0.43 0.44 0.40 0.62y 2.26
Indonesia 1.62y 3.42 0.16 1.45 -3.05 -0.93 1.29? 1.73
Iran -0.76 -0.67 -0.19 -0.69 -4.77 -0.48 -0.96 -0.41
Italy 0.98y 4.08 -0.05 -0.99 -0.20 -0.31 0.41y 2.95
Japan 1.02y 3.58 -0.01 -0.22 1.32 1.43 0.84y 4.10
Korea 1.96y 3.37 0.24? 1.85 -5.30 -1.30 -0.91 -0.99
Malaysia 2.06y 4.72 0.01 0.09 -3.19y -2.25 0.47 1.40
Mexico 1.42y 3.20 0.05 0.44 -0.42 -0.14 0.66 0.91
Morocco 0.71 1.42 0.06 0.48 -0.01 -0.01 0.73y 2.48
Netherlands 0.91y 4.03 0.00 -0.07 -1.47? -1.84 0.10 0.52
New Zealand 0.37 1.08 0.02 0.17 -2.19y -2.29 0.07 0.26
Nigeria -0.89 -1.33 -0.49y -3.42 -4.51 -1.04 1.62? 1.76
Norway 0.63y 3.13 0.06 1.24 -2.06 -0.93 0.89? 1.66
Peru 2.60y 3.33 0.27 1.56 -2.80 -0.89 0.51 0.72
Philippines 0.85y 2.55 0.01 0.17 -0.43 -0.32 0.74y 2.27
Singapore 2.68y 6.35 0.19y 2.01 -0.02 -0.02 1.09y 3.70
South Africa 0.69y 2.84 -0.09 -1.60 0.09 0.09 0.48y 2.21
Spain 0.83y 3.16 -0.05 -0.77 -2.71y -2.65 0.24 1.02
Sweden 0.83y 3.14 -0.06 -1.05 -2.42y -2.44 0.02 0.10
Switzerland 0.38? 1.87 -0.16y -3.38 1.62 1.25 0.78y 2.57
Thailand 1.44y 3.36 0.05 0.48 2.14 0.79 1.02 1.57
Tunisia 0.96y 2.25 0.15 1.59 -0.30 -0.20 0.41 1.23
Turkey 1.49y 2.17 0.19 1.18 3.68 1.60 0.74 1.36
UK 0.51y 2.39 -0.04 -0.73 0.52 0.40 0.04 0.12
USA 0.87y 3.85 0.05 0.85 -1.01y -2.01 0.00 0.01
Venezuela 1.62y 2.51 0.08 0.53 5.13? 1.65 3.26y 4.30
Number of rejections
y signicance at 5% 28 3 6 15
? signicance at 10% 30 6 11 19
Note: This table reports the coe¢ cients and t-statistics of the global output shock, vy;t, and global scal policy shock,
vb;t, in the country-specic VARs. Signicant values at 5% and 10% are denoted by subscripts y and ?, respectively.
The lower panel of this table summarizes the number of rejections at 5 percent and 10 percent nominal levels. There
are 39 countries in the dataset.
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5.4 FEVDs and IRFs of the global shocks
Using the global shocks, v^t, we estimate the country-specic models in (8) and form the associated
GVAR model, as dened by (10).13 Based on this representation, we compute forecast error variance
decomposition for the two sets of shocks (global versus national), and compute impulse response
functions for the two global shocks. By orthogonality of the two types of shocks, the Forecast Error
Variance Decomposition (FEVD) contributions of the two sets of shocks (common and country-specic)
sum up to 100 percent. For details of the derivations of the forecast error variance decompositions see
Appendix A.2.
Table 4 reports a summary of FEVD results. These ndings do not depend on the chosen ordering
(12)-(13). We note that global shocks are clearly important, but their importance vary with the
variable type and the horizon being considered. On average, global shocks account for about one third
of the total variance of output growth across countries. The importance of global shocks for output
growth is slightly lower, about a quarter, for short (year Y=0) horizon as compared to 31 percent at
long horizons (Y=10). Global shocks are comparatively less important for the debt-to-GDP variable,
about one eights at short horizon (Y=0) and one fth of total variance at longer horizons.
Figure 2 shows the e¤ects of one standard error (s.e.) increase in v^y;t and v^b;t. These impulse-
response functions depend on the ordering (12)-(13). As can be seen, the e¤ects of both global
shocks tend to vanish within 4-5 years, with the e¤ects of shocks to the global growth factor being
relatively more persistent. Global growth shocks lower debt-to-GDP ratio, with one percentage point
(ppt) increase in median output growth (across countries) following the global growth shock resulting
in about 2ppt decline in the median debt-to-GDP ratio in Y=0. Global scal policy shock, v^b;t,
stimulates output with a lag, and the positive e¤ects on output persists for 2-3 years. A 1ppt increase
in debt-to-GDP following the global scal policy shock results in 0.18ppt increase in median output
in Y=1, and 0.17ppt in Y=2, before declining to 0.08ppt in Y=3 (median across countries).
13We allow for country-specic lag orders for domestic variables, pi, and cross-section averages, qi, both selected by
BIC with the maximum lag orders pmax = qmax = 2.
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Table 4: FEVD: Global and national shocks (medians across countries)
output growth
Years Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 5 Y = 10
Global shocks 24.3% 27.4% 30.9% 31.1%
National shocks 71.9% 63.2% 58.2% 58.1%
debt-to-GDP growth
Years Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 5 Y = 10
Global shocks 12.2% 17.2% 20.7% 20.8%
National shocks 77.5% 67.1% 62.8% 62.8%
Notes: Columns refer to the chosen horizon Y = 0; 1; 5; and 10 years. Median values across R = 2000 bootstrap
replications are reported. The details on the variance decompositions are provided in Appendix A.2. The details of the
bootstrapping procedure are provided in Appendix A.3.
Figure 2: Impulse response function for the e¤ects of global shocks (median across
countries)
Positive one s.e. global output shock
Real output Debt-to-GDP
Positive one s.e. global scal shock
Real output Debt-to-GDP
Notes: The plots in this gure show impulse responses of identied global shocks using the triangular ordering given by
(12)-(13). Medians and 20-80 percent quantile ranges (across countries) are reported.
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6 National shocks
For identication of national shocks, it is useful to distinguish between identication of shocks within
a given country, and identication of shocks across countries. The former problem has received a
great deal of attention in the applied macro literature, some reviewed in Section 2, where a number
of identication schemes have been considered and discussed. In contrast, the latter identication
problem has received little attention. Notable exceptions are spatial econometric models, where origins
of shocks are identied using geographic or economic distance often embodied in a priori specied
spatial weight matrix.
Our modelling approach allows idiosyncratic shocks to correlate across countries, so long as this
correlation is weak. To shed light on this correlation, we computed regularized reduced-form error
covariance matrix estimate of  = E ("t"0t) proposed by Bailey, Pesaran, and Smith (2018), and
found that only a few of these pair-wise covariances (over i and j) are non-zero. In particular, we nd
nonzero covariances in only 4 out of 2964 possible country-variable pairs! The country-pairs with non-
zero correlations are given in Table A4 in the Appendix. Given the evidence of almost no correlation
of "it across countries, in what follows we only allow for within country non-zero covariances, and
assume that idiosyncratic errors are not correlated across countries. In e¤ect, we are assuming that
the common shocks, vt, capture almost all important cross country error correlations.
We are thus left with the problem of identifying the di¤erent types of shocks within a given country
i, namely ndingAi such that it = Ai"it, where it can be viewed as national structuralshocks. Any
identication scheme proposed in the (standard) VAR literature could be employed for this purpose.
Here we follow the approach by Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) which uses sign restrictions in a
Bayesian context to identify it.
Our identifying assumptions are based on the following premise. We view national shocks that
result in:
 negative contemporaneous correlation between yit and bit as a technology shock,
 positive contemporaneous correlation between yit and bit as a scal policy shock.
Hence, a technology shock increases output and decreases debt-to-GDP ratio. A scal policy
shock increases output as well as debt-to-GDP ratio. Given our assumption that "it (and hence it)
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are uncorrelated over i, we only need to consider identication of it for each i; separately. In what
follows we simplify the notations by dropping the subscript i, and abstracting from global shocks and
dynamics which are not essential to the identication problem under consideration.
According to the above identication scheme, we write the corresponding structuralmodel as,
bt =  yt + bt, (14)
bt = yt + yt, (15)
where ;  > 0 and V ar (t) = D, D is diagonal with

2b; 
2
y
0
on the diagonal, and t =
 
bt; yt
0.
The above system of equations can be rewritten equivalently in terms of debt and output, using
bt = dt  yt,
dt = (1  ) yt + bt, (16)
dt = (1 + ) yt + yt, (17)
in which  = (1  ) is the elasticity of debt with respect to output when output expands due to
a technology shock, and  = (1 + ) is the elasticity of debt with respect to output when output
expands due to scal policy shock. In what follows we refer to  (  < 1) and  ( > 1) as debt
elasticities corresponding to technology and scal policy shocks, respectively.
Let xt = (bt;yt)
0 and write (14) and (15) as
A xt = t, where A =
0B@ 1 
1  
1CA ,
which is similar to the textbook demand-supply model discussed recently within a Bayesian context
by Baumeister and Hamilton (BH). The corresponding reduced-form representation is
xt = A
 1t| {z } ,
"t
where A 1 =
1
+ 
0B@  
1  1
1CA . (18)
Hence, bt (expansionary scal policy shock) gives rise to a positive correlation between yt and bt,
and yt (contractionary technology shock) gives rise to a negative correlation between yt and bt.
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Consider the variance of the reduced-form shocks dened by "t = A 1t,
V ("t) = A
 1DA 10 = 
 =
0B@ !11 !12
!21 !22
1CA ,
where 
 can be consistently estimated using time series observations on bt and yt. Let 2 = !11!22 >
0, and  = !12p!11!22 , and note that A
 1DA 10 = 
 denes the estimable function f (; ; ; ) =
0; which links  and  in terms of  and . Hence, for given population values of the reduced-
form parameters  and , the structural parameters  and  can take any point on the function
f (; ; ; ) = 0. After some algebra, we obtain (similarly to eq. (51) of BH)
 =
2 + 
+ 
, or  =
2   
    .
It is now easy to see that if  > 0, then  > 0 is unrestricted, and  is restricted to lie within
 <  < =. On the other hand, if  < 0, then  > 0 is unrestricted, and  is restricted to lie in the
range   <  <  =. In vast majority of countries (34 out of 39) the LS estimates of ^ is negative.
Therefore, without imposing additional restrictions (e.g. in form of prior distributions on ; ),  and
 are not point-identied. Sign restrictions only yield set identication. We shall follow the Bayesian
approach of BH and impose priors on  and  to estimate individual country-specic models in a
Bayesian framework, imposing priors on the reduced-form parameters.14 After conditioning on global
shocks, we identify national shocks by considering each country separately. We use the same types of
priors as in BH. For  we use a truncated student t distribution with location c = 0:6, scale  = 0:6
and degrees of freedom  = 3, such that  > 0. This ensures that Pr (0:1 <  < 2:2) = 90 percent,
prior mean is 0.91, prior median is 0.76, and prior interquartile range is [0.43,1.18]. The same prior
distribution is also used for .
6.1 Debt elasticities
As discussed above, the elasticity of debt with respect to output is  = (1  ) when output expands
due to technology shock, and  = (1 + ) when output expands due to scal policy shock. Summary
measures of posterior distributions of  and  are presented in Table 5. With the exception of Belgium,
posterior means and medians are smaller than the priors. Averaged across countries, the posterior
medians of  and , reported in the last row of Table 5, give an average estimate of 0.75 for the
14The full description of priors is provided in the Appendix A.4.
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median debt elasticity when the output rise is due to a technology shock, and 1.4 when the output rise
is due to a scal policy shock.15 These estimates provide some quantitative guidelines for the relative
e¤ects of technology and scal policy shocks on debt-to-GDP ratio, and suggest that undue reliance
on scal policy shocks to simulate the economy can very quickly lead to higher levels of public debt
to GDP. Supply-side policies that improve the rate of technical progress would also be needed if such
a scenario is to be avoided.
Posterior interquartile ranges for  in majority countries (31 out of 39) are smaller than posterior
interquartile range of . However, these intervals are still quite wide as compared to the priors for most
of the countries, which is reective of both estimation uncertainty as well as weak prior identication.
Figure A1 in the Appendix compares the posterior medians of  and  with the standard VAR models
without augmentation by global shocks and lagged cross section averages. The di¤erences between
the posterior medians of  and  in country-specic models with and without CS augmentation are
in the range of -0.1 to 0.07 in the case of  and in the range of -0.17 to 0.27 in the case of . Hence
omission of global shocks tends to lead to larger di¤erences in the case of debt elasticities following a
scal policy shock.
Figure 3 plots priors and posteriors for  and  in the case of four selected countries: U.S., Brazil,
Germany, and Italy. Full set of results is provided in the online supplement (Figures S1-S39). The
posterior distributions of  and  are much more skewed than the priors, with signicant mass close
to zero in the case of some countries.
15 If we use the median of the country-specic posterior medians we obtain the estimates 0.20 and 0.42 for  and ,
respectively, which are very close to the mean estimates of 0.25 and 0.40 that we use in our analysis.
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Table 5: Posterior mean, median, and interquartile range for parameters  and  across
countries
 
mean median range mean median range
Argentina 0.16 0.09 [0.07, 0.15] 0.74 0.58 [0.16, 1.03]
Australia 0.43 0.16 [0.04, 0.69] 0.46 0.15 [0.04, 0.68]
Austria 0.47 0.31 [0.18, 0.64] 0.68 0.38 [0.14, 0.83]
Belgium 1.07 0.93 [0.64, 1.32] 1.11 1.00 [0.75, 1.32]
Brazil 0.30 0.05 [0.03, 0.45] 0.59 0.28 [0.02, 0.81]
Canada 0.39 0.20 [0.10, 0.55] 0.55 0.33 [0.08, 0.83]
Chile 0.27 0.16 [0.11, 0.32] 0.57 0.48 [0.12, 0.96]
China 0.69 0.55 [0.15, 1.01] 0.20 0.11 [0.08, 0.19]
Ecuador 0.33 0.20 [0.14, 0.42] 0.60 0.44 [0.11, 0.92]
Egypt 0.51 0.24 [0.04, 0.77] 0.38 0.11 [0.04, 0.56]
Finland 0.19 0.17 [0.14, 0.21] 0.78 0.64 [0.28, 1.07]
France 0.38 0.08 [0.02, 0.63] 0.48 0.13 [0.02, 0.70]
Germany 0.44 0.35 [0.25, 0.55] 0.64 0.49 [0.19, 0.93]
India 0.55 0.42 [0.27, 0.70] 0.63 0.47 [0.20, 0.88]
Indonesia 0.33 0.11 [0.06, 0.47] 0.58 0.32 [0.05, 0.82]
Iran 0.20 0.05 [0.03, 0.17] 0.60 0.48 [0.05, 0.95]
Italy 0.43 0.38 [0.30, 0.51] 0.71 0.56 [0.23, 0.99]
Japan 0.52 0.31 [0.13, 0.75] 0.50 0.30 [0.13, 0.74]
Korea 0.16 0.11 [0.09, 0.16] 0.68 0.60 [0.22, 1.04]
Malaysia 0.38 0.27 [0.19, 0.48] 0.67 0.47 [0.15, 0.92]
Mexico 0.31 0.09 [0.04, 0.46] 0.52 0.30 [0.04, 0.82]
Morocco 0.62 0.57 [0.46, 0.72] 0.78 0.64 [0.32, 1.05]
Netherlands 0.50 0.28 [0.13, 0.69] 0.53 0.32 [0.12, 0.78]
New Zealand 0.43 0.35 [0.27, 0.52] 0.68 0.52 [0.20, 0.95]
Nigeria 0.38 0.16 [0.08, 0.56] 0.49 0.29 [0.06, 0.80]
Norway 0.35 0.05 [0.02, 0.56] 0.41 0.18 [0.02, 0.76]
Peru 0.23 0.14 [0.10, 0.25] 0.63 0.53 [0.14, 1.00]
Philippines 0.60 0.40 [0.10, 0.88] 0.36 0.21 [0.13, 0.47]
Singapore 0.46 0.29 [0.17, 0.61] 0.59 0.41 [0.14, 0.86]
South Africa 0.37 0.23 [0.15, 0.48] 0.59 0.42 [0.11, 0.89]
Spain 0.27 0.17 [0.12, 0.32] 0.60 0.49 [0.13, 0.95]
Sweden 0.32 0.21 [0.14, 0.40] 0.60 0.46 [0.12, 0.93]
Switzerland 0.34 0.11 [0.06, 0.50] 0.54 0.29 [0.05, 0.81]
Thailand 0.14 0.12 [0.10, 0.15] 0.71 0.64 [0.28, 1.06]
Tunisia 0.41 0.30 [0.20, 0.51] 0.64 0.46 [0.16, 0.91]
Turkey 0.61 0.43 [0.12, 0.90] 0.37 0.23 [0.15, 0.48]
UK 0.44 0.18 [0.04, 0.71] 0.39 0.15 [0.05, 0.65]
USA 0.55 0.44 [0.31, 0.69] 0.66 0.51 [0.22, 0.92]
Venezuela 0.35 0.16 [0.09, 0.49] 0.52 0.34 [0.07, 0.83]
Average 0.41 0.25 0.58 0.40
Notes: Prior mean for  and  is 0.91, prior median is 0.76, and prior interquartile range is [0.43,1.18].  = (1  ) is
the elasticity of debt with respect to output when output expands due to a technology shock, and  = (1 + ) is the
elasticity of debt with respect to output when output expands due to a scal policy shock.
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Figure 3: Posterior distributions of parameters  and  for selected countries
United States
Brazil
Germany
Italy
Notes:  = (1  ) is the elasticity of debt with respect to output when output expands due to technology shock, and
 = (1 + ) is the elasticity of debt with respect to output when output expands due to scal policy shock.
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6.2 E¤ects of scal and technology shocks
The corresponding impulse response functions for national technology and scal shocks are provided
in Figure 4 for the four selected countries and in the online supplement for the remaining economies.
Similarly to the e¤ects of global shocks, the e¤ects of national shocks dissipate rather quickly, within
2-3 years.
Using country-specic models without augmentation by global shocks and lagged cross section
averages (or CS augmentation for short), will lead to miss-specied estimates. Figure 5 compares
the contemporaneous e¤ects of one standard error (s.e.) country shocks identied from VAR models
with or without the augmentation. The contemporaneous e¤ects of technology shock on output are,
on average, about 20 percent smaller, and the contemporaneous e¤ects of scal shocks on output are
about 18 percent smaller. Larger di¤erences are seen for countries, where global shocks explain larger
share of the business cycle uctuations. Since reduced-form shocks in models without CS augmentation
are (by construction) always larger than the reduced-form errors in models with CS augmentation,
estimated impacts of identied country shocks in the models without CS augmentation are in general
over-estimated. In few cases (e.g. for some shock-variable combinations in Nigeria or Australia), the
reported impact e¤ects are smaller due to consequences of CS augmentation for the identication
(rotation of reduced-form errors).
The CS augmentation does not a¤ect only the variance of the reduced-form shocks, but also
their covariances, and the autoregressive reduced-form coe¢ cients. Hence, the CS augmentation can
have consequences for all horizons of the IRFs. Posterior medians of the IRFs of national scal and
technology shocks in models with and without CS augmentation are compared for all countries in the
dataset in Figures S40-S78 in the online supplement. For countries with marginal increase in t from
the CS augmentation (i.e. countries with the lowest standard error ratios reported in the last two
columns of Table A3 in Appendix, such as Iran or Egypt), there is a little di¤erence between these two
estimates, as to be expected. However, there are di¤erences beyond the contemporaneous period for a
number of countries where the global shocks explain nonnegligible fraction of the variance of domestic
variables.
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Figure 4: Posterior median (solid line) and 95 percent posterior credibility sets for the
e¤ects of 1 percent technology and scal policy shocks for selected countries
United States
Brazil
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Figure 4 (Continued): Posterior median (solid line) and 95 percent posterior credibility
sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and scal policy shocks
Germany
Italy
Notes: The plots in this gure show impulse responses of identied national one percent expansionary scal policy and
technology shocks. Hence, the magnitudes on impact are given by the posterior distribution of
1
i+i

i  i
1 1

= AiS, where S =

1 0
0  1

denes the expansionary shocks.
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Figure 5: Impact e¤ects of unit (one s.e.) national shocks in models with and without
global shocks (median of posterior distribution)
Expansionary scal shock on output
Positive technology shock on output
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Figure 5 (Ctd.): Impact e¤ects of unit (one s.e.) national shocks in models with and
without global shocks (median of posterior distribution)
Expansionary scal shock on debt-to-GDP
Positive technology shock on debt-to-GDP
Notes: The plots in this gure show contemporaneous impulse responses of identied national one standard error (s.e.)
expansionary scal and technology shocks in models with and without CS augmentation. The magnitudes on impact
are therefore given by the posterior distribution of AiD
1=2
i S, where Ai is given by (18), Di is posterior variance of
scal and technology shocks, and S =

1 0
0  1

denes the expansionary shocks.
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7 Conclusion
This paper builds on earlier contributions in the GVAR literature and considers the problem of iden-
tication of global and national shocks. To this end it rst provides a general GVAR representation
of a multi-country error correcting model with unobserved common factors, and shows that such a
model can be written in terms of (reduced-form) global shocks computed as residuals from a VAR in
observed global variables estimated either as cross section averages of the country-specic variables
or their rst principal components (as compared to using a pre-selected number of PCs from all the
country-specic variables pooled together).
The proposed approach is applied to analyze the interactions between public debt and real output
growth in a multicountry setting, and the results are compared to those obtained from single country
VARs. We nd strong evidence in support of allowing for global shocks in country-specic VARs,
which contribute to between one-fth and one-third of total variance of country-specic variables at
long horizons. Similarly to Cesa-Bianchi, Pesaran, and Rebucci (2018), we nd that a triangular
ordering of the global variables is justied for identication of global output and scal shocks. Finally,
we follow Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) and implemented weak identication restrictions in form
of priors to identify national technology and scal policy shocks using a Bayesian approach. The
results from our multicountry analysis are compared to standard single country VAR analyses and
their di¤erences highlighted. It is found that posterior median debt elasticity with respect to output
is much larger when the rise in output is due to a scal policy shock, as compared to when the rise in
output is due to a positive technology shock. The cross country average of the median debt elasticity
is 1.58 when the rise in output is due to a scal expansion as compared to 0.75 when the rise in output
follows from a favorable technological advance.
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A Appendix
This Appendix is organized as follows. Section A.1 derives GVAR representation for a global factor-
augmented VECM model. Section A.2 provides the expressions for forecast error variance decomposi-
tions used to decompose the forecast error variance into the contributions from the sets of global and
national shocks. Section A.3 describes the bootstrapping procedure for the calculation of condence
intervals for the e¤ects of global shocks. Section A.4 sets out the priors used for estimating the e¤ects
of national scal and technology shocks. Section A.5 gives details of data sources. Section A.6 provides
additional estimates.
A.1 Derivation of GVAR representation using global factor-augmented error-
correcting model.
Suppose there are N countries, let xit be a k  1 vector of domestic (country-specic) variables in
country i = 1; 2; :::; N , and collect all n = Nk variables in the n  1 vector xt = (x01t;x02t; :::;x0Nt)0.
Further suppose that xt is a¤ected by an m 1 vector of unobserved common factors, denoted by gt,
and the combined (n+m) 1 vector of observed and unobserved variables, zt = (x0t;g0t)0, follows the
vector error correction (VECM) model
zt =  zt 1 +
p 1X
`=1
 `zt ` + ut, (A.1)
where we abstracted from deterministic components to simplify the exposition. This is a general
high-dimensional, multicountry VAR model which involves a large number of unknown parameters
even for moderate values of k, N and m. Partition the vector of innovations as ut =
 
e0t;v0gt
0,
e0t = (e01t; e02t; :::; e0Nt)
0, in which eit, for i = 1; 2; :::N , are k1 vectors of country-specic reduced-form
innovations, possibly correlated with vgt, and vgt is an m 1 vector of (common) global shocks. Let
E (eitjvgt) =  vivgt, in which  vi; for i = 1; 2; :::; N and k m loading matrices. Then, eit can be
written as eit =  vivgt + "it (also see (3)).
We consider the following assumptions on the coe¢ cients and errors of the multicountry VECM
model (A.1).
Assumption 1 (Coe¢ cients) Let  (z) = In+m  
Pp
`=1 `z
`, where z 2 C, 1 = In+m   +  1,
` =  `    ` 1 for ` = 2; 3; :::; k   1 and p =   p 1.
(i) The roots of the determinantal equation det [ (z)] = 0 satisfy z = 1 or z > 1 +  for some  > 0
that does not depend on N .
(ii) The matrix  has reduced rank r < Nk + m, i.e. we can write  = 0, where  and 
are Nk +m r matrices of full column rank.
(iii) The (Nk +m  r)  (Nk +m  r) matrix ? ? has full rank, where   = In+m 
Pp 1
`=1  `,
and ? and ? are the orthogonal complements of  and , respectively.
Assumption 2 (Innovations) eit is given by factor representation (3), where supi k vik < K,
vgt = (vg1t; vg2t; :::; vgmt)
0  IID (0;
v), and "t = ("01t; "02t; :::; "0Nt)0  IID (0;
e), where "it =
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eit E (eitjvgt). The row-norm of 
e is bounded in N . sups;tE jvgstj4+ < K, supi;s;tE j"istj4+ < K,
where "ist are individual elements of "it = ("i;1;t; "i;2;t; :::; "ikt)
0. vgt is independently distributed of "t0
for all t and t0. In addition,
 
v0gt; "0t
0 is independently distributed of v0gt0 ; "0t00 for any t 6= t0.
Assumption 1 is the standard assumption for VECM models featuring I (1) variables. Condition
(i) rules out the possibility of explosive or seasonal unit roots. Conditions (ii) and (iii) rule out I (2)
processes, and ensure that there are exactly Nk+m  r unit root variables in the model. Assumption
2 rules out strong cross-sectional dependence in the innovations, "it, but allows the reduced-form
country-specic shocks eit to be strongly cross sectionally dependent via the global shocks, vgt.
Under the above assumptions, stochastic decomposition of zt given by VECM model (A.1) directly
follows from results in Section 22.15 of Pesaran (2015b). We have:
zt = z
?
0 + C
tX
`=1
ut + C
 (L) ut, (A.2)
where z?0 = C

z0  
Pp 1
`=1  `z `

is the contribution of the initial values (z0; z 1; :::; z p+1),
C = ?
 
0? ?
 1
0?, (A.3)
and the coe¢ cients of the matrix polynomial C (L) are recursively obtained using
C` =  C` 1 +
p 1X
`=1
 `C

i ` (A.4)
with C0 = In+m C, C 1 = C 2 = ::: = C k+1 =  C. Hence, using (3), partitioning C and C (L)
conformably as
C =
 
Cxx Cxg
Cxg Cgg
!
, C (L) =
 
Cxx (L) Cxg (L)
Cgx (L) Cgg (L)
!
,
and partitioning further Cxx;Cxg;Cxx (L) and Cxg (L) conformably into k  k blocks denoted by
additional subscripts i or i; j, namely Cxx;ij ,Cxg;i;Cxx;ij (L) and C

xg;i (L), we have
xit = x
?
i0 + Cxg;ivt + C ;i (L) vgt +
NX
j=1
Cxx;ije;jt +
NX
j=1
Cxx;ij (L) "it, (A.5)
for i = 1; 2; :::; N , where
e;jt =
tX
`=1
ej` and v;t =
tX
`=1
vg`,
are stochastic trends, and C ;i = Cxg;i (L) +
PN
j=1 C

xx;ij (L)  vi.
Without further restrictions, (A.5) is subject to the well-known curse of dimensionality problem.16
16The number of parameters of an unrestricted VAR grows at a quadratic rate with n, so restrictions are obviously
needed when n and T grow at the same rate. Onatski and Wang (2018) recently considered Johansens likelihood ratio
framework when the number of variables (n) is allowed to increase with T , but restrict the number of cointegrating
vectors, r, to rise relatively slowly such that r=n! 0. However, in practice, the number of cointegrating vectors is likely
to increase with the number of variables (countries) and a more general set up is required.
33
To avoid this problem, some researchers have focussed on a small number of countries using unrestricted
VAR models, where cross-country interconnections, Cxx and Cxx (L), can be freely and directly esti-
mated. This avenue has been followed, for example, by Dungey and Osborn (2013) who model Euro
Area and U.S. macro variables in a cointegrating 7-variable VAR model. But this approach omits the
inuence of unobserved common factors and could lead to biased estimates.
An alternative approach, which we adopt here, is to consider a large number of countries but
assume
Cxx;ij = 0 and Cxx;ij (L) = 0 for i 6= j, (A.6)
that restricts Cxx and Cxx (L) to be block diagonal, and capture the cross cross-country intercon-
nections via unobserved common factors. This set up can be further generalized, without any funda-
mental consequences to the large-N representations derived below, by allowing coe¢ cients of Cxx;ij
and Cxx;ij (L) to be small, uniformly of order O
 
N 1

, which can arise as an equilibrium outcome of
multi-country structural macro models (Chudik and Straub (2017)), or could be motivated economet-
rically by noting that many of the o¤-diagonal coe¢ cients must be small for variances to exist (Chudik
and Pesaran (2011)). These restrictions do not allow for o¤-diagonal coe¢ cients to be bounded away
from zero in N , which arises in the presence of dominant unit(s) present (Chudik and Pesaran (2013)),
or in the presence of local neighbor e¤ects (Chudik and Pesaran (2011)). We abstract from such
dominant or local e¤ects, but we note that they could be accommodated if the identity of dominant
unit(s) and/or the identities of local neighbor pairs were known.
In addition to condition (A.6), we assume gt is causal for xt, namely
Cxg = 0 and Cxg (L) = 0,
and, for simplicity and without loss of generality, we set Cgg = Im, which leads to the following
representation
gt =
p 1X
`=1
 g`gt ` + vgt. (A.7)
Following Pesaran (2006), we use cross-section averages and their lags to obtain an approximation
of common shocks vgt and common stochastic trends vt =
Pt
`=1 vgt. Let W = (Wi;W2; :::;WN )
0
be an n k weighting matrix that satises the granularity conditions (5) and dene the k  1 vector
of cross-section averages xt given by (4). To obtain an approximation of vgt, we rst note that the
moving average representation of xt is given by
xt = Cxv (L) vgt + Cx" (L) "t, (A.8)
where
Cxv (L) = S
0
xC (L)  zv, and Cx" (L) = S
0
xC (L) Sx,
in which Sx is (kN +m)  kN selection matrix that selects xt = S0xzt,  zv = ( 0v; Im)0,  v =
( 0v1; 
0
v2; :::; 
0
vN )
0, and
C (L) =
1X
`=0
C`L
`;C` = C

`  C` 1, for ` = 0; 1; :::. (A.9)
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First-di¤erencing xt and using (A.8), we obtain
xt = w (L) vgt +Op

N 1=2

, (A.10)
where w (L) = W0Cxv (L), and W0Cx" (L) "t = Op
 
N 1=2

, since by Assumption 2 "it is weakly
cross-sectionally dependent. We assume next that the left inverse of w (L) exists so that the space
spanned by the shocks vgt is recoverable from xt and their lags.
Assumption 3 (Recovering vgt using cross section averages) The left inverses of w (L) and
w (L) = limN!1 w (L), denoted by
Bw (L) = 
 
w (L) and Bw (L) = 
 
w (L) , (A.11)
exist.17
Remark 1 Let w (L) =
P1
`=0
w;`L
` and Bw (L) =
P1
`=0
Bw;`L
`, and note that w (L) = W0Cxv (L) =
W0S0xC (L)  zv, where C (L) =
P1
`=0 C;`L
` , with C;0 = In+m , and hence
w;0 =
NX
i=1
Wi v;i   w;v. (A.12)
Bw;0 =
 
 0w;v w;v
 1  0w;v;
and Bw;0 w;0 = Im. Consequently, for Assumption 3 to hold it is necessary that the km matrices
 w;v and  w;v = limN!1  w;v have full column ranks. These rank conditions resemble the rank
conditions in the CCE literature (Pesaran (2006)) which deals with a simpler setting. Finally, it is
necessary that k  m for these rank conditions to hold.
Using (A.10) and Assumption 3, we obtain
vgt = Bw (L) xt +Op

N 1=2

. (A.13)
Recalling (A.12), we can write (A.10) as
xt =  w;vvgt +
1X
`=1
w;`vg;t ` +Op

N 1=2

,
and substituting (A.13) for the past values of vgt, we obtain the following large-N representation for
xt,
xt =
1X
`=1
	w;`xw;t ` +  w;vvgt +Op

N 1=2

, (A.14)
where
P1
`=1
	w;`L
` =
 P1
`=1
w;`L
`

Bw (L).
To derive an approximation of the common stochastic trends, vt, we take the cross-section aver-
age of the MA representation of xt, and note that (under weak cross-sectional dependence of "it in
17Specically, Bw (L) w (L) = Im and Bw (L) w (L) = Im.
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Assumption 2), we have the following stochastic upper bound
W0S0xCSx
tX
`=1
"` = Op

N 1=2t1=2

, (A.15)
for t = 1; 2; :::; T . Assuming that Dw and D = limN!1 Dw are full column rank, where Dw =
W0S0xC zv, then, using (A.15) in the MA representation of xt, and noting that W0S0xC (L) Sx"it =
Op
 
N 1=2

, we obtain
vt = b
?
x + Awxt   Aw Dw (L) vgt +Op

N 1=2t1=2

+Op

N 1=2

, (A.16)
for t = 1; 2; :::; T , where
Aw =
 
D0w Dw
 1 D0w, (A.17)
and Dw (L) = W0SxC (L)  zv. Substituting (A.13) in (A.16) now yields
vt = b
?
x + Awxt + A

w (L) xt +Op

N 1=2t1=2

+Op

N 1=2

, (A.18)
for t = 1; 2; :::; T , where
Aw (L) =  Aw Dw (L) Bw (L) . (A.19)
Finally, a large-N ECM representations for individual country models can be obtained as follows:
Using results in Section 22.15 of Pesaran (2015b) for gt given by (A.7), we obtain
gt = g
?
0 + vt + C

g (L) vgt, (A.20)
and gt = Cg (L) vgt,where Cg (L) and Cg (L) are dened in the same way as C (L) in (A.4) and
C (L) in (A.9), but with g = 0 and  g` instead of  and  `. Using (A.20) and substituting (A.16)
for vt, we have
gt = Cg Awxt + Cgv (L) vgt +Op

N =2 1T 1=2

+Op

N 1=2

, (A.21)
where Cgv (L) = Cg (L)  Aw Dw (L). Using (A.21) in the VECM representation for xit, we obtain
xit =  ;ie0iexi;t 1 + p 1X
`=1
 xxi`xi;t ` + Qi (L) vt + "it +Op

N 1=2t1=2

+Op

N 1=2

,
where exit = (x0it; x0t)0, ei =  0xi;0gi Aw0,
Qi (L) =  vi +ie0i Cg (L)  Aw Dw (L)+ p 1X
`=1
Cg (L)L
`,
and  xgi` is dened by the partitioned  xi` = ( xxi`; xgi`). Substituting now (A.13) for vgt, we obtain
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the following large-N country ECM representations
xit =  ie0iexi;t 1 + p 1X
`=1
 xxi`xi;t ` + i (L) xt + "it +Op

N 1=2t1=2

+Op

N 1=2

,
for t = 1; 2; :::; T , where
i (L) = Qi (L) B
 1
w (L) =
1X
`=0
i`L
`. (A.22)
When i = 0, we have
xit =
p 1X
`=1
 xxi`xi;t ` + i (L) xt + "it +Op

N 1=2

.
To obtain the representation featuring the global and national error structure, we can substitute (A.14)
in i;0xt.
A.2 Forecast error variance decompositions for the sets of global and national
shocks
Consider the following moving average representation of the GVAR model,
xt = + H (L) (Bvvt + "t) ,
where H (L) = G 1 (L), G (L) = IkN  
PpT
`=1 G`L
` and  = G 1 (L) a. Forecast error variance
explained by the global and national shocks, at horizon h = 0; 1; 2; :::, are given by
FEV Dc (h) =
hX
`=0
H`"H
0
`,
FEV Dg (h) =
hX
`=0
H`BvvB
0
vH
0
`,
respectively, where " is the covariance matrix of "t and v is the covariance matrix of vt. Note
that regardless of rotation matrix Av, forecast error variance explained by the rotated global shocks,
Avvt, is numerically identical to FEV Dg (h). The total forecast error variance is FEV D (h) =
FEV Dg (h) + FEV Dc (h), and the share of forecast error variance explained by the global shocks is
given by FEV Dg (h) =FEV D (h).
A.3 Description of the bootstrapping procedure for the e¤ects of global shocks
Let t0 denote the rst time period where observations on residuals for all countries are available.
Bootstrapping procedure is described in the following steps.
1. Let "^t =
 
"^01;t; "^
0
2;t; :::; "^
0
Nt
0, for t = t0; t0 + 1; :::; T , where "^it is the vector of LS residuals
from conditional country models (8). Let E = ("^t0 ; "^t0+1; :::; "^T ). For each bootstrap replication
r = 1; 2; :::; R, we randomly draw with replacement T pT column vectors from E. The bootstrap
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draws are then re-centered to ensure that their temporal average is zero for each i. Denote these
re-centered draws by "^(r)it , for i = 1; 2; :::; N , t = pT + 1; pT + 2; :::; T and r = 1; 2; :::; R. For each
bootstrap replication r, we also randomly draw with replacement T   pT vectors from the set
fv^tgTt=t0 , and we re-center the draws to ensure that the temporal average of the draws is zero.
The resulting re-centered vector draws are denoted as v^(r)t .
2. We compute bootstrap replications x(r)t based on the estimates of the GVAR marginal model
(10), namely
x
(r)
t = a^+
pTX
`=1
G^`x
(r)
t ` + B^v^
(r)
t + "
(r)
t
for t = pT+1; pT+2; :::; T , r = 1; 2; :::; R, with the starting valuesx
(r)
` = x` for ` = 1; 2; :::; pT .
3. For each bootstrap replication r = 1; 2; :::; R, the bootstrapped data is trimmed from the begin-
ning to match the available sample, and we then use the generated unbalanced panel data for
estimation of the e¤ects of global shocks and for FEVDs.
A.4 Priors used for estimating the e¤ects of national scal and technology shocks
The structural representation of country-specic models (8) is given by
Aixit = Aiaxi +
piX
`=1
(Aix;i`) xi;t ` +
qiX
`=1
(Aix;i`) xt ` + (AiBi) v^t + it, (A.23)
for i = 1; 2; :::; N . Let x;i` = Aix;i`, 

x;i` = Aix;i`, B

i = AiBi, and a

xi = Aiaxi. In addition, de-
ne !it =

1; v^t;x
0
i;t 1; :::;x
0
i;t pi ;x
0
t 1; :::;x0t qi
0
andQi =
 
a0xi;B
0
i ;

x;i1; :::;

x;ipi ;

x;i1; :::;

x;iqi
0.
Then (A.23) can be compactly written as
Aixit = Qi!it + it.
We assume it  IID (0;Di), where Di is diagonal. We impose priors on Ai;Qi;Di to estimate
country-specic models (A.23), and to conduct IRF analysis for national shocks. We specify the same
priors as in BH,
p (Ai;Qi;Di) = p (Ai) p (DijAi) p (QijDi;Ai) .
For future reference, let di;jj be the j-th diagonal element of Di, and q0ij be the j-th row of Qi.
The natural conjugate priors for Qi, and Di are considered as in BH.
Prior for Di
Gamma distribution with the shape parameter i and the rate parameter (or the inverse scale
parameter)  i, denoted as   (i;  i), is used as a prior for the reciprocals of the diagonal elements of
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Di (taken to be independent across equations)
p

d 1i;jj
Ai =
8<:

i
i
 (i)

d 1i;jj
i 1
exp

  id 1i;jj

for d 1i;jj  0,
0 otherwise:
Hence, i= i is the prior mean and i=2i is the variance of the prior. We set i =  i = 0:
Prior for Qi
Coe¢ cients inQi are taken to be independent across equations, p (qij jDi;Ai) =
Q2
j=1 p (qij jDi;Ai).
Normal priors N (mij ; di;jjMij) are used for qij ,
p (qij jDi;Ai) = 1
(2)k=2 jdi;jjMij j1=2
 exp
h
  (1=2) (qij  mij)0 (di;jjMij) 1 (qij  mij)
i
,
where k is the dimension of qij . mij is the prior mean and di;jjMij is the prior variance. We set
M 1ij = 0.
Prior for Ai
Recall that
Ai =
 
1 i
1  i
!
and A 1i =
1
i + i
 
i i
1  1
!
.
For i, we use student t distribution with location parameter ci = 0:6, scale parameter i = 0:6
and degrees of freedom i = 3, truncated to be positive. This ensures that Pr (0:1 < i < 2:2:) =
90 percent, prior mean is 0.91, prior median is 0.76, and prior interquartile range is [0.43,1.18]. The
same prior distribution is used for i.
A.5 Data
Output growth is computed using real gross domestic product (GDP) data series obtained from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics database. The gross govern-
ment deb-to-GDP data series for the majority of the countries are downloaded from
http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/9/ which are the updates of those dis-
cussed in Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011). For Iran, Morocco, and Nigeria the debt-to-GDP series are
obtained from the IMF FAD Historical Public Debt database. We focus on gross debt data due to
di¢ culty of collecting net debt data on a consistent basis over time and across countries. Moreover,
we use public debt at the general government level for as many countries as possible (Austria, Bel-
gium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and Tunisia), but given
the lack of general public debt data for many countries, central government debt data is used as an
alternative.
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A.6 Additional result tables and gures
Table A1: Maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics for testing cointegration in VAR(4)
models in (yit; dit)
0.
Deterministics: unrestricted intercepts and no linear trends.
H0 H1 Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Canada Chile China
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 7.88 3.89 17.81 7.10 17.06 7.35 6.56 5.58
r  1 r = 2 0.31 2.04 5.05 2.79 2.07 5.79 0.27 0.00
(b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 8.19 5.93 22.86 9.89 19.13 13.14 6.82 5.58
r  1 r = 2 0.31 2.04 5.05 2.79 2.07 5.79 0.27 0.00
H0 H1 Ecuador Egypt Finland France Germany India Indonesia Iran
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 15.02 14.77 16.20 27.51 16.86 11.52 17.57 17.67
r  1 r = 2 1.22 6.20 6.68 11.09 5.11 8.58 1.57 0.84
(b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 16.24 20.97 22.88 38.60 21.96 20.10 19.13 18.51
r  1 r = 2 1.22 6.20 6.68 11.09 5.11 8.58 1.57 0.84
H0 H1 Italy Japan Korea Malaysia Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 12.62 23.85 20.98 12.38 10.20 6.66 10.75 4.12
r  1 r = 2 4.90 4.63 3.91 4.64 1.24 0.08 6.55 0.23
(b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 17.52 28.49 24.89 17.02 11.45 6.74 17.30 4.34
r  1 r = 2 4.90 4.63 3.91 4.64 1.24 0.08 6.55 0.23
H0 H1 Nigeria Norway Peru Philippines Singapore South Africa Spain Sweden
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 9.44 11.69 15.85 10.43 21.18 6.72 19.00 6.41
r  1 r = 2 0.00 8.13 1.40 0.00 6.38 0.23 6.49 0.69
(b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 9.44 19.82 17.25 10.43 27.56 6.95 25.49 7.10
r  1 r = 2 0.00 8.13 1.40 0.00 6.38 0.23 6.49 0.69
H0 H1 Switzerland Thailand Tunisia Turkey UK USA Venezuela
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 10.66 13.84 14.28 5.41 10.70 10.63 9.05
r  1 r = 2 5.26 8.83 2.01 0.01 0.60 2.65 2.36
(b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 15.92 22.67 16.29 5.42 11.30 13.28 11.41
r  1 r = 2 5.26 8.83 2.01 0.01 0.60 2.65 2.36
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Table A1(Ctd.): Cointegration tests statistics for the VAR(4) models in (yit; dit)
0.
Deterministics: unrestricted intercepts and restricted linear trends.
H0 H1 Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Canada Chile China
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 10.14 12.06 17.85 8.93 18.22 9.41 9.24 19.63
r  1 r = 2 4.54 3.89 6.09 4.61 11.14 7.34 4.30 5.57
(b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 14.69 15.95 23.94 13.53 29.36 16.74 13.54 25.20
r  1 r = 2 4.54 3.89 6.09 4.61 11.14 7.34 4.30 5.57
H0 H1 Ecuador Egypt Finland France Germany India Indonesia Iran
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 18.69 16.50 16.20 27.55 20.33 14.87 23.53 18.17
r  1 r = 2 11.09 13.32 7.39 11.52 5.16 10.65 4.33 15.99
(b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 29.78 29.83 23.59 39.07 25.49 25.52 27.86 34.16
r  1 r = 2 11.09 13.32 7.39 11.52 5.16 10.65 4.33 15.99
H0 H1 Italy Japan Korea Malaysia Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 25.77 23.91 20.98 17.02 11.23 10.76 20.51 17.31
r  1 r = 2 4.92 6.47 6.46 6.41 8.99 5.86 6.76 3.81
(b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 30.69 30.38 27.44 23.44 20.22 16.62 27.26 21.11
r  1 r = 2 4.92 6.47 6.46 6.41 8.99 5.86 6.76 3.81
H0 H1 Nigeria Norway Peru Philippines Singapore South Africa Spain Sweden
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 26.40 11.93 20.34 17.58 21.27 6.77 19.10 8.84
r  1 r = 2 6.29 8.32 8.55 9.97 6.78 2.36 7.00 4.67
(b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 32.69 20.25 28.89 27.55 28.05 9.13 26.10 13.51
r  1 r = 2 6.29 8.32 8.55 9.97 6.78 2.36 7.00 4.67
H0 H1 Switzerland Thailand Tunisia Turkey UK USA Venezuela
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 29.95 17.04 15.08 22.39 14.26 10.71 11.48
r  1 r = 2 9.57 10.00 6.27 5.39 5.59 2.65 7.96
(b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 39.52 27.05 21.35 27.78 19.85 13.36 19.44
r  1 r = 2 9.57 10.00 6.27 5.39 5.59 2.65 7.96
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Table A2: Estimates of long-run relationships between real GDP and public debt
(in logs)
Unrestricted intercepts and no linear trends Unrestricted intercepts and restricted linear trends
Exactly Theory restriction Co-trending restriction Co-trending & theory
identied ( = 1) ( = 0) restriction ( = 1)
Bootstrapped Bootstrapped Bootstrapped
Country LR Critical Values LR Critical Values LR Critical Valuesb (d:f: = 1) 1% 5% b (d:f: = 1) 1% 5% (d:f: = 2) 1% 5%
Austria 3.8674 1.1653 11.2627 6.0984      N/A         N/A   
(13:6969)
Brazil 1.5362 1.3339 9.3370 6.2584 1.5362 1.1628 11.3256 6.6432 2.4966 14.3109 10.2205
(0:94641) (0:94561)
China      N/A      0.53352 14.1378 19.8391 13.8566 19.6136 27.6080 22.9566
(0:024718)
Ecuador 8.4008 7.0627 13.1067 9.0936 8.3994 3.6719 13.7931 8.0240 10.7346 19.7259 14.9056
(27:0542) (26:4435)
Egypt 0.76555 1.3094 11.203 6.4050 0.76555 1.7294 13.8929 8.0832 3.0388 17.6195 11.3400
(0:10471) (0:10471)
Finland 0.21752 9.4161 16.8036 10.6689      N/A         N/A   
(0:049579)
France 0.31725 16.3753 13.5892 8.0999 0.31720 0.039077 9.9713 6.1465 16.4144 18.0087 12.8632
(0:018467) (0:018469)
Germany 0.41423 11.6382 16.1652 12.2464 0.41470 3.4684 11.6633 6.5882 15.1058 23.6078 17.3975
(0:016329) (0:016334)
India 0.96127 0.10157 10.3836 7.1798      N/A         N/A   
(0:11059)
Indonesia 1.0555 0.20668 11.8274 6.9002 1.0555 5.9685 14.3651 8.5834 6.1752 17.6587 11.8289
(0:12972) (0:12972)
Iran 4.1026 12.3382 13.9755 8.6277 4.1026 0.49545 12.9670 7.3050 12.8337 20.4609 15.4487
(1:6480) (1:6480)
Italy      N/A      0.14005 13.1499 15.2560 8.4779 17.0032 19.7953 15.2036
(0:13172)
Notes: LR is the log-likelihood ratio statistic for testing the long-run relations, with the number of over-identifying
restrictions being 1 when imposing the co-trending restriction and 2 when imposing the co-trending and theory restriction,
 = 1. The bootstrapped upper ve and one percent critical values of the LR statistics are provided in the columns
succeeding the LR statistic and are based on 1,000 replications. Absence of cointegration is denoted by N/A.
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Table A2 (Ctd.): Estimates of long-run relationships between real GDP and public
debt (in logs)
Unrestricted intercepts and no linear trends Unrestricted intercepts and restricted linear trends
Exactly Theory restriction Co-trending restriction Co-trending & theory
identied ( = 1) ( = 0) restriction ( = 1)
Bootstrapped Bootstrapped Bootstrapped
Country LR Critical Values LR Critical Values LR Critical Valuesb (d:f: = 1) 1% 5% b (d:f: = 1) 1% 5% (d:f: = 2) 1% 5%
Japan -1.3830 1.6169 12.3486 6.6169 -1.3831 0.054375 12.2260 6.8696 1.6713 15.8543 10.1096
(3:8338) (3:8333)
Korea 1.3490 2.3135 10.3941 6.3123 1.3494 0.0013715 15.9267 7.5705 2.3149 18.2881 12.1167
(0:37446) (0:37493)
Netherlands      N/A      0.47503 9.7599 16.1083 10.2065 13.7801 21.5214 15.7776
(0:15151)
Nigeria      N/A      -1.0300 16.9552 16.1804 10.9377 21.9590 22.1361 17.4550
(0:92598)
Norway 0.84714 0.24269 12.0481 8.1459      N/A         N/A   
(0:30695)
Peru 2.6913 5.1248 11.3001 7.6144 2.6914 4.4879 13.2248 7.3006 9.6127 17.8555 12.2960
(1:9000) (1:8997)
Philippines      N/A      0.61546 7.1522 16.2292 11.4066 9.5112 22.2690 16.0998
(0:10522)
Singapore 0.87169 2.6419 10.2929 6.4445 0.87087 0.093595 10.6603 5.9846 2.7352 14.1450 10.1463
(0:045114) (0:044607)
Spain 0.30712 12.0582 13.1157 9.0201 0.30639 0.099640 14.3696 8.2081 12.1572 23.3977 15.4830
(0:029635) (0:029613)
Switzerland      N/A      0.45409 19.2878 15.8701 10.8585 20.5091 19.2661 14.7360
(0:13429)
Thailand 0.41466 4.3014 13.6185 8.3670 0.41466 3.2041 14.0818 9.2958 7.5054 19.5468 14.3438
(0:24095) (0:24095)
Turkey      N/A      0.68453 16.9764 16.2285 10.4355 20.2006 21.6337 17.0066
(0:074578)
Notes: LR is the log-likelihood ratio statistic for testing the long-run relations, with the number of over-identifying
restrictions being 1 when imposing the co-trending restriction and 2 when imposing the co-trending and theory restriction,
 = 1. The bootstrapped upper ve and one percent critical values of the LR statistics are provided in the columns
succeeding the LR statistic and are based on 1,000 replications. Absence of cointegration is denoted by N/A.
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Table A3: Standard errors of reduced-form shocks in models with and without global
shocks
Single country VARs With global shocks Ratio (without/with)
yit equation bit equation yit equation bit equation yit equation bit equation
Argentina 0.049 0.353 0.045 0.306 1.084 1.154
Australia 0.016 0.138 0.015 0.104 1.114 1.326
Austria 0.019 0.053 0.012 0.042 1.537 1.261
Belgium 0.035 0.036 0.032 0.035 1.098 1.022
Brazil 0.036 0.257 0.027 0.236 1.315 1.090
Canada 0.018 0.066 0.014 0.058 1.356 1.139
Chile 0.048 0.243 0.045 0.188 1.070 1.293
China 0.016 0.144 0.015 0.119 1.109 1.211
Ecuador 0.042 0.174 0.036 0.149 1.166 1.165
Egypt 0.033 0.184 0.029 0.177 1.119 1.041
Finland 0.029 0.136 0.022 0.102 1.297 1.332
France 0.015 0.097 0.009 0.095 1.572 1.025
Germany 0.024 0.059 0.019 0.051 1.276 1.151
India 0.027 0.079 0.025 0.073 1.064 1.080
Indonesia 0.030 0.210 0.026 0.184 1.159 1.138
Iran 0.051 0.431 0.048 0.414 1.065 1.040
Italy 0.019 0.041 0.013 0.034 1.458 1.216
Japan 0.022 0.073 0.017 0.056 1.326 1.301
Korea 0.034 0.209 0.027 0.192 1.238 1.088
Malaysia 0.035 0.101 0.025 0.081 1.422 1.246
Mexico 0.031 0.193 0.026 0.182 1.198 1.062
Morocco 0.034 0.082 0.032 0.070 1.069 1.177
Netherlands 0.019 0.056 0.014 0.051 1.315 1.083
New Zealand 0.024 0.071 0.023 0.064 1.021 1.098
Nigeria 0.041 0.269 0.035 0.227 1.161 1.184
Norway 0.015 0.160 0.013 0.145 1.146 1.105
Peru 0.046 0.188 0.040 0.169 1.153 1.111
Philippines 0.026 0.099 0.023 0.090 1.123 1.105
Singapore 0.035 0.099 0.022 0.072 1.570 1.364
South Africa 0.021 0.068 0.016 0.061 1.268 1.129
Spain 0.020 0.073 0.015 0.059 1.298 1.240
Sweden 0.021 0.070 0.015 0.057 1.357 1.224
Switzerland 0.019 0.092 0.013 0.085 1.462 1.085
Thailand 0.035 0.188 0.028 0.179 1.219 1.050
Tunisia 0.024 0.097 0.023 0.084 1.062 1.159
Turkey 0.040 0.141 0.037 0.125 1.076 1.127
UK 0.018 0.091 0.014 0.087 1.294 1.049
USA 0.019 0.035 0.015 0.032 1.307 1.088
Venezuela 0.052 0.259 0.044 0.211 1.182 1.227
Averages
Advanced 0.022 0.087 0.017 0.075 1.318 1.168
Emerging 0.036 0.188 0.031 0.166 1.154 1.139
All countries 0.029 0.139 0.024 0.122 1.234 1.153
Note: This table reports the estimates of standard errors of the reduced-form shocks in country-specic models with
and without CS augmentation. The last two columns report the ratio of standard error estimates in the models without
the CS augmentation (in the numerator) and with CS augmentation (denominator). By construction, this ratio  1.
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Table A4: Country pairs with statistically signicant correlations between their
national shocks
Country and variable pairs ^
(1) Indonesia (y) Malaysia (y) 0.71
(2) Sweden (y) Finland (y) 0.71
(3) USA (b) New Zealand (b) 0.60
(4) USA (y) Canada (y) 0.71
Notes: We estimated the covariance matrix of the reduced-form national errors using the regularized reduced-form error
covariance matrix estimate proposed by Bailey, Pesaran, and Smith (2018). The pairs with nonzero correlations are
reported in this table, together with the correlation coe¢ cients.
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Figure A1: Comparison of parameters  and  across countries in models with and
without global shocks
(medians of posterior distributions)
Parameter 
Parameter 
Notes: This gure plots posterior medians of  and  in country-specic models with and without CS augmentation.
 = (1  ) is the elasticity of debt with respect to output when output expands due to technology shock, and
 = (1 + ) is the elasticity of debt with respect to output when output expands due to scal policy shock.
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This online supplement is organized in two sections. Section S1 presents gures for the prior
and posterior distributions of country-specic parameters i and i, for i = 1; 2; :::; N , and summary
measures of posterior distribution of the e¤ects of technology and scal policy shocks. Section S2
provides gures for the comparison of the e¤ects of national technology and scal policy shocks in
models with and without global shocks.
S1 The prior and posterior distributions of parameters  and ,
and summary measures of posterior distribution of the e¤ects of
technology and scal policy shocks
Figure S1: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Argentina
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S2: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Australia
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
2
Figure S3: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Austria
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
3
Figure S4: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Belgium
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
4
Figure S5: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Brazil
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S6: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Canada
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
6
Figure S7: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Chile
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
7
Figure S8: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for China
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
8
Figure S9: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Ecuador
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S10: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Egypt
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S11: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Finland
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S12: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for France
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S13: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Germany
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S14: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for India
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S15: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Indonesia
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S16: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Iran
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S17: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Italy
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
17
Figure S18: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Japan
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
18
Figure S19: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Korea
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
19
Figure S20: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Malaysia
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
20
Figure S21: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Mexico
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
21
Figure S22: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Morocco
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
22
Figure S23: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Netherlands
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
23
Figure S24: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for New Zealand
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
24
Figure S25: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Nigeria
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S26: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Norway
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
26
Figure S27: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Peru
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
27
Figure S28: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Philippines
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
28
Figure S29: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Singapore
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
29
Figure S30: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for South Africa
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
30
Figure S31: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Spain
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
31
Figure S32: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Sweden
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
32
Figure S33: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Switzerland
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
33
Figure S34: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Thailand
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
34
Figure S35: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Tunisia
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S36: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Turkey
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
36
Figure S37: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for UK
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
37
Figure S38: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for USA
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
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Figure S39: Posterior distributions of parameters  and , and the e¤ects of 1 percent
technology and scal policy shocks for Venezuela
Posterior distributions of parameters  and 
Posterior median (solid line) and 80 percent credible sets for the e¤ects of 1 percent technology and
scal policy shocks
39
S2 E¤ects of national technology and scal policy shocks in models
with and without global shocks
Figure S40: IRFs for Argentina in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
40
Figure S41: IRFs for Australia in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S42: IRFs for Austria in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S43: IRFs for Belgium in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S44: IRFs for Brazil in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S45: IRFs for Canada in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S46: IRFs for Chile in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S47: IRFs for China in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S48: IRFs for Ecuador in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
44
Figure S49: IRFs for Egypt in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S50: IRFs for Finland in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S51: IRFs for France in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S52: IRFs for Germany in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S53: IRFs for India in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S54: IRFs for Indonesia in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S55: IRFs for Iran in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S56: IRFs for Italy in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S57: IRFs for Japan in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S58: IRFs for Korea in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S59: IRFs for Malaysia in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S60: IRFs for Mexico in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
50
Figure S61: IRFs for Morocco in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S62: IRFs for Netherlands in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S63: IRFs for New Zealand in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S64: IRFs for Nigeria in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S65: IRFs for Norway in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S66: IRFs for Peru in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S67: IRFs for Philippines in models with and without CS augmentation
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S68 IRFs for Singapore in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S69: IRFs for South Africa in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S70: IRFs for Spain in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S71: IRFs for Sweden in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S72: IRFs for Switzerland in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S73: IRFs for Thailand in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S74: IRFs for Tunisia in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S75: IRFs for Turkey in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S76: IRFs for UK in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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Figure S77: IRFs for USA in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
Figure S78: IRFs for Venezuela in models with and without global shocks
(median of posterior distribution)
Response of debt-to-gdp to scal shock Response of debt-to-gdp to technology shock
Response of output to scal shock Response of output to technology shock
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